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FORMATION ANALYSE ET POLITIQUE ECONOMIQUES (APE) MASTER - DOCTORAT
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Behavioral Economics and Finance
Milo Bianchi – Paris School of Economics – Fall 2009
Course Presentation:
Standard economic theory postulates that individual decisions are the product of purely self-interested and perfectly rational agents. A substantial body of literature documents that these assumptions are often inaccurate, and that individuals display systematical departures from the standard paradigm. For example, agents face limitations in their ability to process all the relevant information and they are very sensitive to the way this information is framed. They overestimate their ability to perform a task and they may take actions which are not in their long-run interest. They care about other people’s utility and about how other people perceive their actions.
Behavioral economics documents these “biases” and incorporates them into alternative models of decision-making and strategic interactions. In this course, we offer an overview of some of the most active lines of research in this field. Along the course, we will provide evidence (especially from the field) on individual departures from the standard economic paradigm, analyze these phenomena with rigorous formal models, and discuss how these behaviors affect strategic and market interactions.
The course is intended to stimulate some critical thinking about the fundamental building blocks of economic theory and provide some avenues to enrich them. Our ultimate goal is to introduce participants to a set of questions and tools to enable them to start their own journey into (behavioral) economics research.
List of Topics:
- Introduction: what is behavioral economics, and why should we care.
- Prospect Theory
Applications: labor supply and investors’ behaviors
- Bounded Rationality I: Decision making, Information Processing and Framing
Applications: financial and consumer credit markets
- Bounded Rationality II: Strategic Interactions with Partially Sophisticated Agents
Applications: bubbles and political economy
- Intertemporal Choices and Self-Control
Applications: health and saving decisions
- Self-Confidence
Applications: stock markets and occupational choices
- Social Preferences I: Social esteem
Applications: prosocial behaviors, occupational choices, norm enforcement
- Social Preferences II: Fairness
Applications: firms and workers behaviors
Conclusion: where do we stand, achievements and challenges ahead.
Evaluation:
80%: Term paper on a topic of your choice (related to the course and agreed with me.) The paper can be theory or applied, it should be short (5-10 pages) and contain some original idea, however preliminary. It may be a starting point for your master thesis. The term paper must be handed in by December 17.
20%: Participation in class. This includes a short (5-10 minutes) informal presentation during the last lecture, November 12, in which you discuss the idea you intend to develop in the term paper.
Lecture notes:
Lecture notes will be distributed in class. If you cannot attend a class and would like to read the lecture notes, please send me an email.
List of required readings:
(For each topic, a more comprehensive list of references can be found here)
1. Introduction
Camerer, Colin and George Loewenstein. 2003. “Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future.” In Advances in Behavioral Economics, ed. Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein and Matthew Rabin. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rabin, Matthew. 1998. “Psychology and Economics”. Journal of Economic Literature 36:11-46
Stefano DellaVigna, 2007. "Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field," NBER Working Papers 13420
David Hirshleifer (2001), “Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing”, The Journal of Finance 56 (4), 1533–1597.
2. Prospect Theory
* Kahneman D, Tversky A. “Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk.” Econometrica 1979, vol. 47, pp. 263-291.
Koszegi, Botond and Rabin, Matthew. “A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences”, Quarterly Journal of Economics (2006), 121(4), pp. 1133-1166
Odean T. “Are investors reluctant to realize their losses?” Journal of Finance 1998, vol. 53, pp. 1775-1798.
Camerer, C. F., L. Babcock, G. Loewenstein, and R. H. Thaler: “Labor Supply of New York City Cab Drivers: One Day at a Time,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, No. 2, May, 1997, pp. 407-441.
3. Bounded Rationality I
Herbert Simon - A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 69, No. 1. (Feb., 1955), pp. 99-118.
Enriqueta Aragones & Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler, 2005. "Fact-Free Learning," American Economic Review, vol. 95(5), pages 1355-1368.
Barber, Brad and Terrance Odean. “All that glitters: The Effect of Attention and News on the Buying Behavior of Individual and Institutional Investors”, Mimeo 2006.
Marianne Bertrand & Dean S. Karlan & Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir & Jonathan Zinman, 2005. "What's Psychology Worth? A Field Experiment in the Consumer Credit Market," Working Papers 918, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
4. Bounded rationality II
R Nagel, “Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study”, American Economic Review, 1995, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-26
Colin F. Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho & Juin-Kuan Chong, 2004. "A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games," Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 119(3), pages 861-898.
Jehiel, Philippe (2005): “Analogy-based Expectation Equilibrium”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 123(2), pages 81-104. Erik Eyster, Matthew Rabin (2005), “Cursed Equilibrium”, Econometrica 73 (5), 1623–1672.
Milo Bianchi, Philippe Jehiel, 2007 “Speculative Bubbles without Stupid Investors”. Mimeo
Thomas Eisensee & David Strömberg, 2007. "News Droughts, News Floods, and U.S. Disaster Relief," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 122(2), pages 693-728
5. Intertemporal choice
Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 1999. "Doing It Now or Later," American Economic Review, vol. 89(1), pages 103-124, March.
Fudenberg, Drew and Levine, David. “A dual self model of impulse control.” The American Economic Review, Volume 96, Number 5, December 2006
Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, 2006. "Paying Not to Go to the Gym," American Economic Review, vol. 96(3
Thaler RH, Benartzi S. “Save more tomorrow: using behavioral economics to increase employee saving.” Journal of Political Economy 2004, vol. 112, pp. 164-187.
6. Self-confidence
Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2004. "Confidence-Enhanced Performance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1536-1557, December.
Botond Köszegi, 2006. "Ego Utility, Overconfidence, and Task Choice," Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 673-707, 06.
Odean, Terrance. 1999. “Do investors trade too much?” American Economic Review, 89: 1279—1298.
Jose A. Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, 2003. "Overconfidence and Speculative Bubbles," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 111(6), pages 1183-1219.
Antonio E Bernardo, Ivo Welch (2001) “On the Evolution of Overconfidence and Entrepreneurs”, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 10 (3), 301–330.
7. Social Esteem
Bénabou R, Tirole J. “Incentives and prosocial behavior.” American Economic
Review 2006, vol. 96, pp. 1652-1678.
Gneezy U, Rustichini A. “A fine is a price.” Journal of LeGneezy Rustichini 2000 (field experim on deterrence) general Studies 2000,
vol. 29, pp. 1-17.
Harold L. Cole George J. Mailath Andrew Postlewaite "Incorporating Concern for Relative Wealth
Into Economic Models" Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Vol. 19, No. 3, Summer 1995, pp. 12–21
Mariassunta Giannetti & Andrei Simonov?Social "Interactions and Entrepreneurial Activity"
8. Fairness
Rabin, M. (1993) "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics,"
American Economic Review, 83(5):1281-1302.
Bolton GE, Ockenfels A. "ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and
competition."American Economic Review 2000, vol. 90, pp. 166-193.
Fehr E, Schmidt KM. "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation".
Quarterly Journal of Economics 1999, vol. 114, pp. 817-868.
Oriana Bandiera & Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul, 2005. "Social Preferences and
the Response to Incentives: Evidence from Personnel Data," The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, vol. 120(3), pages 917-962.
9. Conclusion
Rubinstein, Ariel "Comments on Behavioral Economics, in Adavnces in Economic
Theory" (2005 World Congress of the Econometric Society), Edited by R.
Blundell, W.K. Newey and T. Persson, Cambridge Univeristy Press, 2006, vol
II, 246-254
Fudenberg, Drew "Advancing Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics,"
Journal of Economic Literature 44(2006): 694-711
Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2006. "Behavioral Economics Comes of Age," Mimeo.
Edward L. Glaeser, 2004. "Psychology and the Market," American Economic
Review, vol. 94(2), pages 408-413.
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| Directeur de la publication : Pierre-Yves Geoffard |
| Conception et réalisation : Madeleine Roux |
| URL : http://www.master-ape.ens.fr |